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Abstract: Our project hinged on the ability of the undergraduate advanced 
Chinese and Japanese students at the UIUC to describe, during short 
interviews, the value of their respective languages in economic terms. 
We found that the undergraduate students involved in learning third-year 
Chinese and Japanese were very well aware of the changing economic 
reasons for learning their languages. Our hypothesis that Japanese 
students were more motivated by popular Japanese media while the 
Chinese students were more motivated by economic reasons was borne 
out by our findings, though to say that our hypothesis was perfect would 
be a gross generalization not cognizant of the outlying data and the 
limitations of our project.
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Neoliberalism, the confluence of aggressive free-market capitalist 
principles and politics originating in the 1960s has gone on to dominate 
global political perspectives since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and 
through the 1990s. Based on works by Friedriech von Hayek and 
students such as Milton Friedman, it contains concepts like 
“spontaneous order” in society, arising from free-market conditions, and 
espouses the limitation of government to ensuring and enforcing the free 
market.
In Lisa Duggan’s, “The Twilight of Equality?” the definition of 
neoliberalism is expanded beyond mere economic constraints and is 
explained as “cultural and identity politics.” Delving into the origin of 
liberalism, neoliberalism’s precursor, Duggan explains that liberalism, 
and thereby neoliberalism, “organizes material and political life in terms 
of race, gender, and sexuality as well as economic class and nationality, 
or ethnicity and religion,” adding later that Liberalist terminology can be 
divided into the master categories of “the state, the economy, civil 
society, and the family.” These terms serve to divide public and private 
life and obscure and justify various impingements on personal rights, 
such as gendered marriage and the racial politics. Duggan further 
argues that neoliberalism seeks “greater wealth and more democracy,” 
at the cost of economic equality and ideological freedom in a variety of 
realms, and contributing to the rise of a new Western imperialism, 
headed by the United States of America and enforced by the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank on less privileged 
nations. Duggan’s “The Incredible Shrinking Public” documented the use 
of culture wars and identity politics in furthering the neoliberal agenda. 
Identity politics seem to be the politics of race, gender, and sexuality, 
economic class, and nationality, or ethnicity and religion, while culture 
wars seem to be the use of normative cultural judgments based on 
identity politics to reduce the footprint of social institutions.
Meanwhile, Giroux’s “Terror of Neoliberalism” takes the 
definitions given in Duggan’s Twilight of Equality and then details the 
faults of neoliberalism as well as a vague outline of a successful 
response to neoliberalism. Specifically, he mentions the corporatization 
of America, legalized corporate tax evasion, upwardly distributed wealth, 
ideologically unforgiving politics devoid of rational discourse, and the 
militarization of society, as well as rising unemployment, the widest rich-
poor gap of contemporary times, civic disengagement and the overall 
undermining of the democratic system, though he doesn’t stop there. 
Possibly more relevant to our class is the effect of neoliberal policies 
abroad, propagated by the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, 
and the International Monetary Fund, and the devastating effects of 
neoliberalism on youths. Abroad, emerging worlds are reduced to relying 
on the patronage of “wealthy nations led by the United States,” while on 
the home front, the youth are subjected to futures with high risks and 
costs with little hope for a return on their investments. Giroux wraps up 
his paper by saying, essentially, that the enemy (neoliberalism) must be 
named and understood before it can be combated, that there are forces 
in action already moving to counter neoliberalism, and that these 
movements and organizations must band together across national lines 
to make another world possible.
Finally, in Ann Phoenix’s European study of the navigation of 
boys’ masculinity versus their study habits in neoliberal knowledge 
societies, it was found that the neoliberalist concept of individual 
responsibility for transformation in order to survive in the market placed 
boys directly at odds with their masculine identity. This is due to the fact 
that studying and schoolwork is seen as a feminine activity, despite 
knowing full well that schoolwork is vital for success in the future.
These authors are well versed in portraying neoliberalism in a 
negative light, and they have convincing and fleshed out arguments 
regarding the detrimental effects of neoliberalism on society. Duggan 
provides an excellent introduction to the origin and history of 
neoliberalism and the broad changes it has wrought to the socio-
intellectual landscape, while Ann Phoenix highlights the specific effects 
neoliberalism has had on today’s youth. Giroux argues for the rallying of 
a movement against neoliberalism. Overall, these papers strongly 
complement each other in a convincing fashion, each building off the 
other, performing examinations of neoliberalism on both a macro and 
micro scale. While Giroux’s argument is the most vehement in implicitly 
calling for action against neoliberalism and outlining a few methods, it 
does not reduce the impact of the points he makes. He derives authority 
from Duggan and many other sources to support his position – he 
seems informed and rational rather than a rabid fanatic. Phoenix and 
Duggan call less aggressively for the dethroning of neoliberalism, but 
are no less convinced of the dangers of such a cutthroat capitalist 
environment.
However, judgment from such a small sample of essays makes it 
difficult to determine the actual scholarly consensus on neoliberalism, 
given that before this class I’d never before encountered the term. In 
order to better understand the issue contradicting views should be 
appraised, seeing as the only definitions of neoliberalism put forth are 
already couched in negative terms by these three authors. Otherwise, 
they could be merely shadowboxing with a construction of their own 
making, which seems unlikely in the face of their arguments, especially 
Duggan’s thorough definition of neoliberalism. Giroux seems too happy 
to blame neoliberalism with the ills of society, or the rise of the “military-
prison-education-industrial complex.” Giroux’s weakest argument is in 
his link between class, color, and gender and the prison-industrial 
complex, which is justified merely by a rhetorical question.
Personally, it would take more extensive reading on liberalism 
and neoliberalism to ascertain both a neutral definition of neoliberalism 
and an idea of the scope of the ideology in order to better understand 
the arguments put forth by these three authors. To be fair, neoliberalism 
also has benefits that might warrant the modification, rather than outright 
revolution. Entrepreneurship is not always inadequate to meet the needs 
of the people, especially in the case of information technology – a world 
without Google would be a world without effective online search, which 
makes the internet that much more expansive. The X-Prizes led to the 
creation of a commercial space travel business, exposed to competitive 
selective pressures that were absent in the government-funded NASA, 
which hadn’t put a vehicle on the moon in decades. Furthermore, the 
world is experiencing the rise of two motions in response to neoliberal 
pressures, the Free/Open Source Software movement and 
crowdsourcing, or Wikinomics, which distribute production costs and do 
away with a sale price. What, in a neoliberal setting, could be better than 
free? Yet at the same time, these movements have been compared to 
socialism. To quote a history teacher of mine, it is Jeffersonian ends 
through Hamiltonian means.
All in all, I am now very curious about neoliberalism as it 
progresses today, its effects and its ramifications, in a global arena than 
merely in America as most of the articles implied. I would also like to 
know more about the effects on youth and the higher education process, 
and whether or not neoliberalism is an accurate frame through which to 
view the world.
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Boo, Katherine. 2004. The New Yorker. The Best Job in Town: The 
Americanization of Chennai. 
http://courses.washington.edu/globfut/req%20readings/BooBestJob.pdf 
Brooks , David . 2001. Atlantic Monthly . The Organization Kid 
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200104/brooks 
This week’s narratives brought several neoliberal narratives into 
focus: Joe and Harish of Office Tiger, and the rise of today’s 
“millennials,” and the Organization Kids. In Chennai, India, Joe, a 
western business mogul, fosters a culture around the selection of top 
talent in the local area, the best and brightest of which is Harish. But with 
so much social capital invested in Office Tiger, what happens when 
Office Tiger invests its fiscal capital somewhere else? Meanwhile in 
America, children are as busy now as they will be in their future roles as 
CEOs, thanks to their baby boomer parents.
In Katherine Boo’s “Best Job in Town,” we follow the story of 
Harish Kumar, who, after an unsuccessful first stint with school, self-
educates himself in IT and gains the attention of, and a job with, Joe, 
Princeton graduate and co-founder of Office Tiger. Office Tiger itself is 
founded by Joe and Randy, two Princeton graduates who saw an 
opportunity in “judgment dependent services” staffed not in America, but 
in India; essentially, they lowered service supply costs through 
outsourcing. As a result, Harish is happily employed, and Office Tiger 
employees are not only willing to work for ten to twenty percent of what 
their American analogues would charge, but they are even honored 
enough by their employment to brand their wedding invitations with the 
company name. Only the best and the brightest are hired at Office Tiger, 
creating an intense level of competition. Harish himself admitted that he 
would not have hired a low-scoring applicant like himself. Meanwhile, his 
work days often stretch from 5:30AM to past midnight, but his daily life 
isn’t the only thing a career at Office Tiger is changing. As highly 
positioned and salaried as he is, he is a good prospect for any wife his 
parents chose for him – that is, if he allowed it. It is a Tamil tradition to 
arrange the marriages of one’s children, but Harish would rather spend 
the time working rather than raising a family. And even after all this 
investment in Office Tiger, with the Indian rupee appreciating at record 
rates against the dollar, Joe and Randy may have to make the decision 
to cut costs and relocate to the Philippines or Sri Lanka, which may 
leave their sixteen-hundred-odd Chennai employers with nothing.
Meanwhile, David Brooks penned an article in 2001 called “The 
Organization Kid,” about the newest generation of college-aged 
overachievers, the sons and daughters of the baby boomers. Having 
lived a highly regimented life since their childhood beginnings, they have 
continued to live the only way they know how by filling their schedule 
with activities – homework, studying, exercising, charity work, sports – to 
the point where it is often necessary to schedule appointments just to 
see their close friends. As a result, there’s less time for the 
characteristically 1960s era college activities such as revolutionary 
ideas, protesting, and relationships. Many of the students, to paraphrase 
from a 1960’s handbook on admissions, enter college in a “prudential” 
frame of mind, as the means to an end as opposed to an end in and of 
itself. Complacency and compliance has increased. Instead of trying to 
change the system, the meritocracy, they are attempting to ascend it. 
Overall, he concludes, between spending much of their time enhancing 
skills, being relatively content, or submitting to authority, the children of 
today are just different. He then explores the possible origins of the 
Organization Kid, from infancy all the way through adolescence, 
highlighting trends in rearing and education along the way. Brooks 
couples the behaviors of the teens he’s seen with a reduced 
generational consciousness – college students today did not spend their 
time trying to break free from the definitions or constraints of the last. 
Countercultures and mainstream have merged, creating an environment 
in which has no overarching culture to defy, where hippies are CEOs of 
multinational corporations and teachers listen to punk and ska.
These articles tell the same story. While they may be about 
different subjects in vastly differing areas, the grand narrative, that of 
neoliberal competition and its consequences, is still the same. Harish is 
the best and the brightest in Chennai, as are many of the kids in 
Brooks’s article, but the true story is about the pyramid, the meritocracy, 
that both create. To quote Masahiro Sakurai, creator of hit game Super 
Smash Brothers and its sequel, Super Smash Brothers: Melee, “if you 
make an environment where everyone is trying to climb their way to the 
top of a single tall mountain, it’s clear that the people having fun would 
be limited to a small number of individuals.” What he is speaking of is 
the exclusivity at the top of the gaming mountain. Though little known 
outside of Korea, gaming is now a profession. However, professional 
gamers must practice multiple hours a day to hone their skills, and 
though a player might be considered skilled in a local sense, that same 
player would be absolutely destroyed on the professional scene. Pro 
gamers game upwards of 5 hours a day, like gymnasts training for the 
Olympics. This is the same thing that the community in Chennai is 
fostering, as well as the American culture of meritocracy, and that is the 
same environment in both cases.
However, to what extent are these forces changing their subjects, 
and what is lost in the process? Harish and his colleagues lose their 
culture little by little, while kids in America lose their ability to defy the 
processes that have created them, limiting them to the box that their 
parents have nurtured them in all their lives. The end goal in both cases 
is a kind of happiness married to the indicator of financial success. It’s a 
narrow perspective, but, properly focused, neoliberal subjects are quite 
“productive” – another term that has been defined by liberalism. Many 
will find that their happiness falls by the wayside, that time is the 
scarcest of resources, and that individuality, that defining characteristic 
of Western society, is at its apex. What that means is that the successful 
will be less willing to compromise their neoliberal lives for the burden of 
a relationship, as has been seen in Brooks’s article, and furthermore that 
family life and kids are an even less acceptable compromise. It’s well 
known that in developed nations the more affluent a household is, the 
less likely it is to have multiple kids. Parents aren’t likely to have much 
time for their kids, and on the other hand the modern day rearing of a 
child, with its busy schedule and making sure everything is just perfect 
for growth and development is a career in and of itself. In China, where 
the one-child policy has been enforced for multiple generations, Chinese 
people are forgetting the words for “aunt,” “uncle,” and “cousin,” words 
that have fallen out of common usage. What ramifications do these have 
on day-to-day life? What kind of new generation are trends like this 
creating?
It would be interesting to see those neoliberal subjects who break 
free of the constraints of the neoliberalist viewpoint, to crack the cosmic 
egg, and then to see if neoliberalism has the ability to co-opt these 
individuals. Specifically, to break free of the view that financial success 
is the definitive measure of success, to reject the notion that economic 
power is the definition of superiority, and to be happy or content 
nonetheless. Such individuals would have to rewrite the definition of 
success to something far more ephemeral, which makes combating the 
ennui of existence that much more difficult. Acquisition and spectacle 
seem, by far, the main methods of doing so today, but spectacle alone 
seems rather shallow and Orwellian. There does seem to be a trend 
towards the Eastern ideas of enlightenment, Dao, contentment, 
meditation, peace, and harmony for well being, but it has been co-opted 
by neoliberalism – Yoga equipment experienced record sales figures 
recently, for example. But this may be nothing more than a trend. So 
where does that leave a paradigm-breaking individual?
I guess we’ll find out in a generation or so.
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Neoliberalism is highly concerned with the development of the 
young and the individual as a knowledge subject. On the one hand, as 
developed in Joe Austin's article, youth are simultaneously the risk 
society takes in neoliberalizing and the spokespeople for avid 
consumerism. On the other hand, as Anagnost puts forward, youth in 
China are disproportionately valued and are also signs of value. 
Meanwhile, Ong argues that the corporatization and globalization of 
learning institutes, specifically American universities, deemphasizes 
moral learning and nationalistic boundaries by creating globe-trotting 
cosmopolitan extra-national citizens, but also uniquely positions 
American universities to shape the moralities of its cosmopolitan 
graduates, domestic or foreign-born.
Austin's article, "Youth, Neoliberalism, Ethics: Some Questions," 
addresses the effects of neoliberal governmentality on youth studies, an 
effect that has been largely ignored in that field, and raises some 
questions based on selected readings, including "Ronald Strickland’s 
edited volume Growing Up Postmodern: Neoliberalism and the War on 
the Young (2002), Mark Cieslik and Gary Pollock’s edited volume Young 
People in Risk Society: The Restructuring of Youth Identities and 
Transitions in Late Modernity (2002), and Alain Badiou’s Ethics: An 
Essay on the Understanding of Evil (1993; trans., 2001)." More 
specifically, he argues that youth as a relatively consequence and 
carefree period is being wiped out as a result of neoliberal advances on 
the core fabric of society, where no period of time is seen as having a 
free lunch. In his analysis of the collected works under the title "Growing 
Up Postmodern," he argues that the prison-industrial complex has 
replaced school as the socializing mechanism for youth instead of 
school due to the erosion of the welfare state, and, by connection, the 
public school system. Justification for this complex has arisen as a result 
of the 1990's predictions of a new wave of "superpredators." Yet, he also 
posits that youth are seen as the ideal consumers, the necessary money 
accelerators for the capitalist engine. Youth are at once marginalized as 
agents of free will and actively participate with the risk society in order to 
develop their own agency. In the second part of his essay, Austin 
directly connects neoliberalism governmentality with youth through 
relevant readings, noting in particular youth's lost security as the welfare 
state is privatized and asking what is being produced as these 
protections are stripped away. In the final portion of his essay, he uses 
Badiou's Essay on the Understanding of Evil to understand the ethical 
ramifications of the neoliberalization of youth, and poses new questions 
from there.
Meanwhile, Anagnost's article on the Child as value begins with a 
story about the youth of China on an expedition in Mongolia, exposing 
Chinese parents' fears about the very nature of their children and their 
children's education. The transformation of China from a Communist 
state to one in which, "Making money is glorious," has changed the 
stakes for Chinese families. There are greater rewards and more 
difficulties in a neoliberalized state. While encouraging a one-child 
household, the Chinese government has also made sure to encourage 
those families to maintain a very "high quality" child in order to both 
reduce population and maintain competitive edge in a global market. 
Towards this goal, maternal and educational labor inputs have increased 
in order to develop "high quality" children. Economic changes in China 
have made abundantly clear the differences between the haves and the 
have-nots, migrant workers giving the educated urban elites a measure 
from which they can derive their own superior value, specifically in 
comparison to each others' children. This generation of parents lost 
many educational opportunities during the Cultural Revolution, save for 
their ability to "eat bitterness" and endure, which they are determined to 
make up for in their children. At the same time, they fear that this 
hardness, the street-smart, practical quality is something that their 
children lack, and something which they attempt to make up for by 
sending their children on camping trips in, say, Mongolia. As a result, 
their anxieties about their children are constantly being compared on a 
transnational level, which Anagnost phrases as being "located in a 
transnational network of gazes of competitive childhoods." Yet, while a 
child can be cultivated, an oppositional fear is "mianbudui shehui," or a 
child's inability to "face society" between family and school obligations, a 
fear which illustrates the human limitations of their children. However, as 
a result of neoliberalism, childhood itself is commoditized, as endless 
products or services arise to feed and satisfy the fears of parents, whose 
financial inputs into the value of their children reflect the commodity that 
is the child. As a result, childhood itself is in a crisis as parents eliminate 
play time in favor of skill-enhancing activities.
Ong argues in "Higher Learning in Global Space" that the social 
technology of education that has long been a staple of a certain type, 
the white male, is being diffused across a wide variety of immigrants, 
global elites, and exchange students, which engenders a rethinking of 
the roles of the university institution. Ong says that the university's 
original roles were as places of cultural as well as analytical thinking, 
inculcating nationalistic and moral goals, heavily tied to the supposed 
ethnic superiority of the white male, as well as the maths and sciences. 
As a result of the globalization and corporatization of the universities, the 
cultural and nationalistic aspects fall to the wayside in order to better 
accommodate students from all over the world, especially in growth 
markets such as China. Graduates of such institutions may have the 
analytical qualities that allow them to succeed in a global market, but 
their allegiances have less and less to do with particular areas of the 
world. However, these globetrotters are not motivated to improve the 
state of Democracy in America or elsewhere, content to be extranational 
citizens of the world. As America's borders become less penetrable after 
9/11, Ong argues that it is time to rethink education in a global reference 
in regards to culture and the arts, as well as the quantitative and 
analytical studies.
In the A*Star packet we were given, three elements are stressed - 
development of potential, economic incentives, and romance. It is made 
to look easy to join the A*Star program, when in reality only the cream of 
the crop is accepted. Once in A*Star, the ability to develop one's 
potential is broken down into a few categories: in terms of adding to 
human potential, with appeals to aiding humanity; in terms of economic 
rewards, with many references to alumni entrepreneurs and the 
commercialization of knowledge products; and in terms of sports, with an 
emphasis on discipline and development, while enjoying work, or at least 
buckling down. Economic incentives underly every page of the packet, 
specifically Singapore's success and, more importantly, survival. This is 
based on continued leadership in knowledge workers and the service 
industry, which is closely tied to Singapore's success as a nation with 
few natural resources. Furthermore, they also appeal to the 
individualistic economic incentives, as noted before, and even directly 
facilitate a form of personal economic incentive, the growth of a fund 
matching the tuition cost for the individual's use after graduation. Finally, 
the entire packet is romanticized in terms of personal relationships as 
couples of highly matched and highly productive knowledge workers, 
and as as the most fitting means towards the goal of personal success 
while contributing to humanity.
These readings all contribute to a sense of despair for a carefree 
childhood, and a suspicion of the future as a place where children are 
larvally vetted in order to produce the optimized human being, with the 
highest suzhi possible, only to emerge later, sticky with the fluids of a 
encapsulated pupahood, to serve the hive that is the capitalist neoliberal 
economic engine. With all the manic emphasis on the development, 
where does the repressed needs of a human populace go? Certainly, 
they don't just disappear. Is the necessary antithesis of neoliberalism the 
rise of the counterculture and development of the arts at just as fierce a 
pace? Nam Hyun Joon, a liquid dancer from Korea, is said to have 
practiced 8 hours a day - surely at the expense of his neoliberal 
education. And yet, he is an example of a youth ideal for young Asians 
everywhere. Korea, in particular, is known to have an extensive bboy 
culture, and those who take it seriously have no time for the neoliberal 
emphasis on knowledge production. A further example of the spectacle 
production vs. knowledge production is the mangaka of the manga 
series "Naruto," Masashi Kishimoto, who was ranked 38th out of 39th in 
his graduating class in Japan. Yet his works are read on a global scale 
by youths around the world.
So what are the youths that don't quite make the cut doing? They 
are not the elite, but they still have that human potential that is so often 
spoken of on a time-limited scale.
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Rofel, Lisa. 1999. Other Modernities: Gendered Yearnings in China After 
Socialism. Berkeley: University of California Press. Pp. 41-95, 166-187, 
217-256. 
This week focused in on the state-managed person in China, 
specifically through Lisa Rofel's narrating of her experiences in China in 
her book "Other Modernities: Gendered Yearnings in China after 
Socialism." In recounting her experiences in Hangzhou, she portrays her 
revelations about the multiple roles of the Chinese people, and how they 
navigate identities and display agency in a post-socialist China. 
Underlying all of this is Rofel's divorce from what she calls a "field of 
Eurocentric hegemonies." She includes three key categories of workers 
in her study of China: those who came of age previous to the Cultural 
Revolution cohort, those who came of age during the Cultural 
Revolution, and those who came of age after the Cultural Revolution. 
Specifically, she speaks to Chen Shifu, Xiao Bao, and Xiao Ma as 
examples of their respective eras.
Chen Shifu is upheld in the Zhenfu factory as being the ideal 
worker, with a long history of involvement with the silk industry, who the 
party officials would have Rofel believed triumphed through the 
backward times before the industry was nationalized. What Rofel finds 
beyond the official party line is an individual who has found self-
empowerment through the new gender roles espoused by the 
Communist government, specifically in the silk industry. Prior to the 
centralization of industry in China, the silk trade was a highly masculine 
craft, with male weavers guarding their secrets closer against competing 
families of male-dominant silk weavers. Comparing this to the common 
modern aphorism, "Men plow, women weave," referring to the fact that it 
weaving is mostly a women's occupation in the modern times, and often 
presented as a natural fact and an artifact of feudal China, it becomes 
evident how vastly the gender landscape has changed. In the time 
before the "women's liberation" of the silk industry, there was a 
distinction between women going "out" to work and "in" to work, with no 
relation to the European hegemonic ideas of public and private, but 
rather what was contained in the household and what was not in the 
household. For instance, a woman staying inside to weave silk was 
perfectly within her rights to do so. However, if she were to exit the 
domain of the household in order to weave, she would be shunned, 
having committed an act just like prostitution. There was great shame in 
leaving the boundaries of the household, if one were a woman, akin to 
becoming "damaged goods," that was related to an inculcated 
dependency on a patriarch in traditional China. As one of these female 
workers who had gone "outside," Chen Shifu took the tenets of the 
liberation to heart, not only re-imaging her personal history as one of a 
strongly independent, ideal female worker suppressed by the masculine 
forces, but also reclaiming her dignity and refuting the shame of thee 
previous era by becoming the ideal Communist worker. What's more, 
Chen Shifu not only liberates herself from her gender, but has co-opted 
parts of the masculine identity in casting off her status as a shameful 
female deviant. With her firm gait and strong speec, other workers define 
her as being "willing to talk," a euphemism normally meaning willing to 
speak without fear of state retribution, but also implying masculinity in 
women, who are supposed to be timid and shy. As Austin Powers said, 
"She's a man, baby!"
Meanwhile, Xiao Bao, in many ways a product of the Cultural 
Revolution and a member of a later generation than Chen Shifu's, is the 
counterpart to Chen Shifu's model worker. Due to her formative years 
during the Cultural Revolution, in which the "olds" were challenged, and 
resistance against authority was a key component in displaying an 
understanding of true Communist values. An active member of the 
Revolution, she was particularly skilled at writing catchy slogans. 
However, her resistance to authority in the space of the factory works at 
cross-purposes to the rest of her coworkers. Specifically in a position of 
authority as the assistant shift leader, her resistance to authority is 
embodied in her refusal to fulfill her own authoritative roles. Her 
despairing defiance is grounded in the cognitive dissonance of her 
existence, caught between believing the ideals of the Cultural Revolution 
and her own position, a limbo perhaps best represented by the table at 
which she is supposed to work, which she never leaves, at once a 
symbol of authority and a stronghold for Dilbert-esque thumb-twiddling, 
fraternizing, and low-key disdain for authority. Unlike Chen Shifu, she 
does not stride confidently into a room. She sits at her desk and 
entertains and is entertained by socializing with the workers of the 
factory. Interestingly, she at once criticizes the peasant women she 
works with, disparaging their quality, yet refuses to leave her position, 
envying men their ability to turn their back on the factory without 
consequences. Her envy of the peasant women and factory men of their 
ability to leave stems from disdain for the women and envy of the men's 
courage. She seems to regret not having gotten a university education, 
and is close-mindedly resigned to her position amongst the peasant 
women, at once convinced of her own higher quality and yetbelieving 
that doors to anything higher had been shut along with the gates to 
university. It is also interesting that, as a woman, she is bound by yet 
another custom of adhering to gender boundaries, another authority she 
is resigned to following, but not willing to supplant, and yet another 
personal limbo.
Another worker, Xiao Ma, is at one point seen yelling at Xiao 
Bao's workers for breaking too many silk threads. Xiao Ma is a member 
of the newest cohort of women workers, one whose primary objective is 
to define themselves in a post-Mao era, rather than to defy authority. As 
such, she does her job well and does it without questioning authority, 
having internalized the challenge of feminine identity rather than the 
challenges of politics. Xiao Ma is the shift leader for the factory, initially 
seen as bustling about and indifferent to matters of love or marriage. 
Yet, after a break from her anthropological fieldwork, Rofel returns to the 
factory to find an exuberantly married, pregnant Xiao Ma on maternity 
leave, and dead set on staying away from the factory for as long as 
possible. Rofel goes on to show how the allegory of postsocialism in 
endorsing the post-Mao modern woman places Xiao Ma at odds with her 
state function as a worker. She also says that, ironically, "the discourses 
of gender identities are produced and deployed by the state," in hopes of 
overcoming Western stereotypes. In overcoming the Western 
stereotypes of Chinese culture by promoting the universality of "modern" 
gender identities, the state manages to shoot itself in the foot by failing 
to convince these same women to remain working. As is most commonly 
seen as natural in the West today is the idea of the female as naturally 
enamored with conjugal love, marriage, and motherhood. However, 
older cohorts have no shame in admitting that they give their children to 
relatives to raise and barely see them, a refutation of the so-called 
nature of a mother, and find discussions of their husbands extraneous. 
Instead, they focus on becoming married as a path to adulthood, to the 
ability to "speak with social authority." And, whereas the concern with 
Xiao Ma's cohort for having a child stems from the supposedly instinctive 
maternal urges that a natural woman is supposed to feel, the older 
cohort is more concerned with the practicality of having a child to fulfill 
filial responsibilities in the parents' old age.
Through all of this, Rofel explores the wide cultural gap between 
her Eurocentric understanding of gender and labor identities and that of 
a vastly different culture, with an equally vast difference in historical 
background and even modernity, and eventually realizes the distance in 
her conceptions of the identity mean challenging the homogenization of 
women or women workers in China. On page 186, she states that, "such 
complex relationships should warn us against easy generalizations 
about 'workers,' 'women,' or 'women workers,' - and perforce 'modernity' 
- as coherent, homogeneous categories." Rofel presents a compelling 
argument, dissecting both the notions of identity and femininity in China, 
and then turning on the preconceived notions of femininity and identity 
that she brings into her fieldwork, coming from a western culture herself. 
Her discovery is dramatized and characterized by her initial clash with 
Yu Shifu on the positions of men and women. She also refutes Western 
generalization about the Chinese emphasis of the group over the 
individual. In Lou Shengzhi she finds an individual who has successfully 
defied practically all the gender roles of any of the time periods she lived 
in, and, what's more, flourished, by navigating her identities as a woman, 
as a wife, and as a capitalist. Her childhood, raised by her parents as the 
son of the family, challenges the overwhelming portrayal of the Chinese 
as strict neo-Confucianists. Her marriage, on her terms and not her 
husband's, not only challenges gender roles, but the facelessness of the 
Chinese people, as her husband went far out of his way for Lou 
Shengzhi out of love. Her success as a capitalist and, further, her 
success under the new China, despite being in a polygamous 
relationship, challenges the state-sponsored message of monogamy, 
and further the Western dogma of monogamy. Her working in her 
husband's factories at once illustrates the differences between the 
concept of inside/outside that was the pre-Cultural Revolution cohort's 
view and the concept of private and public spaces espoused by 
Eurocentric hegemonies, while her fantastic success and drive in either 
environment shows the futility of making generalizations about the roles 
of women in China.
However, examples like Lou Shengzhi are also the weaknesses in 
Rofel's argument. As she uses examples of certain women of a certain 
plant of a certain region within the vast confines of China to highlight 
broader understandings of the Chinese people, the certainty of the 
breadth of her revelations decreases. While interesting, the few cases of 
the extraordinary cannot necessarily be used to prove the ordinary. 
Furthermore, as conjectures subjective purely to herself, her arguments 
may be lofty constructions that exist only in her head. All in all, though, 
she does an excellent job of convincing me of her primary points, and 
opening my eyes to the hegemonic views that affect my notions of 
China. I am particularly taken by the example of Lou Shengzhi and Xiao 
Bao, both defiant and atypical, but for vastly different reasons. As we 
move on in our studies, I hope to find out more about the humanity 
behind the concepts I have of East Asian nations. 
Response 
Paper #5: 
JAPAN 
Uno, Kathleen. 1993. The Death of “Good Wife, Wise Mother.” Post War 
Japan as History. Andrew Gordon, ed. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 293-324. 
Gordon, Andrew. 1998. Managing Society for Business. The Wages of  
Affluence: Labor and Management in Postwar Japan. Harvard University 
Press. 174-194. 
KOREA 
Cho, Hee-yeon. 2000. The Structure of the South Korean 
Developmental Regime and Its Transformation -- Statist Mobilization and 
Authoritarian Integration in the Anticommunist Regimentation. Inter-Asia 
Cultural Studies 1(3): (selection) 410-413.
Nelson, Laura C. 2006. South Korean Consumer Nationalism: Women, 
Children, Credit, and Other Perils. In Sheldon Garon and Patricia L. 
Maclachlan, eds. The Ambivalent Consumer: Questioning Consumption 
in East Asia and the West. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Pp. 
188-208. 
State management in Japan and Korea, such as Korean consumerism 
and Japanese corporate culture, take the stage in this week’s reading. 
The focuses of our readings differ between the two nations: Korean state 
management is focused around anti-communism and appropriate 
consumer spending, whereas Japanese state management centers 
around gender roles and corporate culture.
In Cho Hee-Yeon’s segment, he argues that the Korean developmental 
regime, the “disciplinarization of social and political behaviour in order to 
be accommodated to the dominant rule” of industrial and export 
development, was preceded and engendered by the anticommunist 
regimentation of society. By anticommunist regimentation, he means the 
response to the immediate threat of North Korean military and societal 
advances on South Korea. Furthermore, he relates the situation in 
Korea to the Cold War, which was internalized through the Korean civil 
war and the following perpetual truce and imprisonment and persecution 
of those involved in the working class movement or the opposition party 
by the American Occupation Forces and the South Korean government. 
The result of the developmental regime was the weakening of the 
landlord class so as not to impede the developmental regime. 
Subsequent South Korean social discipline was founded on 
development of industry, exports, and appropriate consumer spending in 
order to maintain a reserve of consumer capital in the case of national 
requirements.
Whereas Cho Hee-Yeon’s article focused on the macro-level backdrop 
of South Korea, Laura Nelson focused specifically on the different 
purchasing pressures on consumers throughout the anticommunist and 
developmental regimes. With the military coup by Park Chung-Hee, an 
emphasis was placed on the restriction of consumer spending in order to 
revitalize the economy, a frugality based on Japanese thought at the 
time. Park Chung-Hee himself was a volunteer for the Japanese during 
occupation, and also took ideas from a brief stint with Communism. His 
regime reduced foreign competition in the domestic market and 
maintained low wages in an attempt to keep South Korea globally 
competitive as an export nation. As a result, the middle and poor classes 
both felt the same hardships and the same urge to conserve spending, 
focusing instead on the next generation. However, as the following 
generation approached adulthood, South Korea began to produce 
consumer electronics, automobiles, and other luxuries in large 
quantities, some of which were sold on the domestic market. Combined 
with a real estate market that polarized the economic situations of the 
poor and middle class families, this laid the groundwork for the 
consumer culture that would engulf Korea. Much was made of frugality, 
and targets of high-spending included women and youth as the 
perpetrators of irresponsible consumer spending. Men’s spending, 
however, was not highlighted due to the near-holy esteem in which 
homosocial spending on drinking, sex, and politics. Government abetted 
criticism came to a halt, however, after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
forced the South Korean government to rely on its citizens for an influx 
of cash through appropriate spending. However, citizens still felt uneasy 
about consumerism, so to boost purchases, the government cut interest 
rates and offered incentives to use credit cards, such as income tax 
incentives for those who spent more than 10% of their income through 
credit cards. As a result, in 2002 there were about four credit cards per 
working person in South Korea, many used to pay off older credit cards 
in an unending cycle. Women and youth came under renewed criticism 
over credit card purchases. However, post 1997 criticism is different in 
that it is less effective at criticizing consumer spending, seeing as 
consumer spending is now a mainstay for the South Korean economy.
In Japan, the original form and subsequent transmutations of ryosai 
kenbo, or “good wife wise mother” were powerful discourses in the roles 
of women in society. Championed by high-profile men in the aftermath of 
the Sino-Japanese war, ryosai kenbo defined women’s social 
contributions as that of wifehood and motherhood – wives managed the 
household, while mothers focused on educating their children. The 
limitations included denial of voting rights, ability to found political 
bodies, and speaking rights in pre-Democratic Japan. Like Korea, 
households and therefore wives were exhorted to practice frugality, and 
were not generally accepted as employees until the end of World War II, 
in which the Japanese government was restructured. Furthermore, 
women were exploited in factories, given lower than living wages, and 
educated for home-making in company positions. Despite muted 
feminist movements, feminism became considered un-patriotic in the 
face of the nationalistic upsurge following the Manchurian incident. To 
make headway, female activists made appeals to motherhood in order to 
raise awareness and increase authority. In the post-war society, despite 
restructuring, Japanese society assumed it was the job of women to be 
mothers and wives first and foremost. However, motherhood gained 
ascendancy for, Uno argues, three reasons: the rise of the independent 
wife, the ease of household chores and thereby increased motherly 
attention on offspring, and the decrease of women in family business. 
Ryosai kenbo perpetuated in labor and in education; home-making 
classes were required for women until 1989. Major women’s 
organizations in post-war Japan sought equity in the framework of wife 
or motherhood. However, feminist movements in the 1970s rejected 
ryosai kenbo as a pretense for equity, and instead emphasized women’s 
choice in not becoming housewives, and further the “feminization of 
work” rather than the “masculinization of women,” opening avenues 
beyond the home and increasing home autonomy, besides. Women’s 
movement also opened up avenues for men, as was the case in one 
Tokyo suburb, where men were granted equal childcare leave as 
women.
Gordon’s article on corporate culture shows the vast degree to which 
corporations managed the average citizen, and what discourse occurred 
between the populace, the government, and the corporations. Business 
leaders pushed the Ministry of education to produce two tiers of workers: 
the top three percent, who would be university educated and groomed 
for management positions, and the rest, who would begin work out of 
high school and needed to master a consistently high level of basic skills 
to be used in the workplace. As a result, university enrollment doubled in 
15 years as parents and children sought higher credentials. However, 
the basic corporate goal had been met in exam based competition and 
group-oriented values, which allowed employers to easily filter out 
employees and at the same time ensured teamwork and submission. 
Exam-based competition continued in the workplace, where continual 
self-improvement was needed to gain promotions. Meanwhile, wives 
were expected to keep the household running while their husbands 
worked, which was reinforced even after the introduction of the EEOL by 
company policy which fulfilled the requirements to the line, but no more, 
and pressured women to assume female careers, many of which had no 
upward mobility. Meanwhile, corporate response to Communist and 
Socialist groups such as Minsei and Ro-on dominating the new 
Japanese emphasis on recreation was to give corporate leisure time an 
agenda. At the peak of Minsei’s membership, corporate Japan decided 
to combat it through pushing membership to conservative rags like 
Sankei, creating anti-left recreational agents, and using leisure activities 
to reinforce capitalist ideals and squeeze out ideological circles. The rise 
of stereos and LPs, as well as karaoke bars, as well as business-world 
subsidies of performances, meant the end of Ro-on, and the slow death 
of ideological circles’ involvement in leisure time. The judicial system 
and its judges instated a culture of corporate loyalty, with severe 
consequences associated with firing, perhaps as a result of their own 
poor situation. Meanwhile, this weakened the unions, as there was little 
real reason to join, as job safety had been inculcated into society and 
corporate structure. Despite worker and union activity, as well as 
Communist hopes, corporate Japan quickly squelched any larger 
movements through national campaigns, criticizing unionism as un-
democratic minority egoism, which seems to have been accepted by the 
majority of Japan. As a result of this nationalism, unions worked with 
corporate Japan to reduce costs and eliminate jobs. A few restraints on 
corporate Japan were environmental and women’s movements. While 
the shinjinrui, or youth aliens, were identified as possible cause for 
change, they proved to do little in changing the status quo. Corporate 
Japan, however, identified for itself a new obstacle to capitalism in 
Japan – the government. A final wildcard in the equation were 
international pressures brought to bear on Japan.
Our readings this week bring to light a great deal of external pressures 
on citizens in Japan and Korea, which interweave quite nicely, even 
bringing together Japan and Korea at some points, as competition 
between Japan and Korea forced, to some extent, the cost-cutting 
tactics employed by Japan in the 1980s. Furthermore, the readings on 
the effects of ryosai kenbo in Japan are well-backed by Gordon’s piece 
on corporate Japan, well enough that, besides a great depth of 
information in Uno’s piece, ryosai kenbo was well enough represented to 
stand on its own. Though expressive on a macro scale, the state-
managed person of Japan and Korea hasn’t been as well represented to 
me as has the state-managed Chinese woman, and my knowledge of 
the people of Japan and Korea lacks the humanistic side. Wives in 
Japan are seen to largely fulfill their role, with exceptions to that only 
scarcely sketched out, while consumers in Korea are seen primarily as 
reserves of wealth, as opposed to humans as were shown in Rofel’s 
pieces last week. I would like to find out less about the Japanese 
mindset so much as one Japanese mind and heart, less about Korean 
anticommunism and more about Korean unification.
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Education and employment, two subjects which, as an undergraduate 
student, are never far from my mind, are also the top priorities for 
students in China and Taiwan, the primary countries in our readings this 
week. How do students in China cope with the vast sweeping changes 
due to the liberalization of the market? What are the criteria of students 
and new graduates as they hunt for jobs, and what pitfalls do they 
encounter? What pressures are Taiwanese students placed under in the 
face of globalization? Amy Hanser, Lisa Hoffman, and Nickola Pazderic 
attempt to answer these questions in this week’s readings.
In “The Chinese Enterprising Self,” Hanser examines how Chinese 
students and employers cope with the newly liberalized economy 
through interviews with ten young men and twelve young women aged 
nineteen to twenty-nine, all with high school degrees or better, making 
them somewhat privileged in China. Hanser argues that neoliberalization 
has changed the game for both prospective employees and the industry 
itself. Framing her understanding of her interviewees is Nikolas Rose’s 
concept of the “enterprising self,” which is an idea of self autonomy and 
material fulfillment through self-discipline in neoliberal societies. In order 
to compare the change in the workforce, Hanser then briefly describes a 
pre-reform China, in which competition was primarily political – 
participation in the workforce was considered aiding the revolution, and 
competition for such jobs was based on political activism. Competition, 
she says, changed the criteria people looked for in a job – in post-reform 
China, jobs became important for Chinese to define themselves and as 
routes of self-fulfillment. In order to find the best jobs, the students and 
graduates she interviewed tended to emphasize flexibility and self-
development when job-hunting. Again comparing pre- and post-reform 
China, Hanser says that the iron rice bowl gradually became obsolete, 
not only by the government, but also by falling out of favor with the 
general populace, who, for the reasons above, could no longer condone 
a stable, static job with little personal fulfillment. However, with the 
changes came disappointments, as few jobs are able to live up to the 
expectations of the new Chinese. Some are unable to find jobs at all, 
and those who find jobs can’t find good ones. Furthermore, gender 
perceptions limit, in many ways, participation in the workforce by 
women.
Hoffman covers in more depth the issues Hanser brings up. She states 
that not only was the labor market changed with the introduction of the 
reformations, the job market was actually created. That means both job-
seekers and employers have to try harder in order to find the optimal 
meeting of supply and demand. However, Hanser makes the distinction 
that choice and freedom aren’t merely the restoration of agency, but a 
new governing tool. Like the US, neoliberal management is ascendant, 
but unlike the US, it is infused with a sense of patriotism. This is 
deliberate – whereas the neoliberal state in the United States and Britain 
are operating in a long tradition of liberalism, China is very quickly 
becoming “de-statized,” which means that the state is retreating in 
tactical ways using taxes and incentives to promote social responsibility 
and autonomy simultaneously. Noting, in the tradition of and even 
quoting Hanser, that Chinese youths wished to match their majors, gain 
experience, and develop their skills, Hoffman further states that the new 
hopes of the Chinese denote a change from emphasis on the job within 
the government to individual position and development. However, far 
from seeking to escape China, the youths tended to see their autonomy 
as coming with responsibilities to the state, and the urge to contribute to 
China’s future. This inculcated by the education system, who guide 
students towards making socially responsible career choices. Using the 
example of a young student who successfully lobbied for a closed 
government position for average pay, Hoffman illustrates a sense of 
responsibility towards the state. In several follow-up examples, she 
shows the paradox of the young Chinese professional – while sipping 
Starbucks in foreign nations, they criticize the affluence that attempts to 
“keep China down.”
Taking a different route, Pazderic’s “Smile Chaoyang” highlights the 
effects of neoliberalism in Taiwan, whose political isolation, poor natural 
resources, and looming conflict with China mean dire straits in the near 
future. She is particularly horrified by the resulting use of cultural critique 
in shaping culture, and the use of the state to create “smiling standard 
bearers of globalization.” Beginning in the 1990s with the reduction of 
state-owned industries, the changes in the Taiwanese society gradually 
phased out programs that weren’t related to the neoliberal demands for 
“autonomy, self-discipline, and technological sophistication…of the work 
force.” She postulates that neoliberalism operates within and transforms 
two conflicting value systems, which she identifies as State Neo-
Confucianism and Enlightenment. The second part of her thesis involves 
the promotion of happiness to create docile, unquestioning workers. 
Discussing State Neo-Confucianism further, she uses a 1970s quiz on 
citizenship training in which the only correct answer to the question of 
the responsibility of the young is to build society. Allegiance to the state 
is reinforced, though Pazderic remains quizzical as to the statehood of a 
country that is no longer recognized by the United Nations. She calls this 
allegiance State Neo-Confucianism, and it is linked to the process of 
testing by the civil service examination. Group structures, stereotypically 
emphasized in discourse about the East, any of which deemed 
inappropriate were suppressed between 1945 and the 1990s. Group 
activities such as boy scout-like organizations have been made 
subservient to the state. The Enlightenment, meanwhile, is the process 
by which the educational system in Taiwan is reworked, at once allowing 
more freedom as the state retreats, and initiating competition and 
infighting as older State Neo-Confucianist professors resent the 
younger, Western-trained and aggressive researchers and professors. 
Graduate students, meanwhile, are caught between the two, and 
produce a feedback loop by playing the two sides against each other. 
The democratic consumerism then, is the freedom of these students to 
choose, though Pazderic derides the both the consumer choices they 
make and the demands they make on the educational system. She 
moves on to explain the rise of neoliberalism and Taiwan’s dependency 
on global competitiveness. Though a manufacturing hub at one point, it 
invested the capital into higher education as the manufacturing industry 
fled to China and South-East Asia. Even education becomes a matter of 
global competition, as places of higher learning strive to both compete 
on a global level and to satisfy their customers – the students. As a 
result, the university proscribes to several international indexes of 
educational rankings in international science indexes (ISI), some 
divisions of which are the Science Index (SI), the Social Science Index 
(SSCI), the Arts and Humanities Citation Index (A&HCI), and the 
Engineering Index (Ei). Meanwhile, an emphasis on BQ, or beauty, 
brains, and behavior quotient, illustrates the Taiwanese reliance on 
happiness and personality education to make the population submissive.
Pazderic comes off as having some sort of agenda, and a negative view 
of students and professors of the Chaoyang university, and of the entire 
Taiwanese educational system, or even the whole of Taiwan. She 
appeals to the stereotypical group-oriented view of the Chinese and 
criticizes State Neo-Confucian views, such as the urge to rebuild the 
state, as well as Taiwan-centric views for little reason other than that 
Taiwan is not recognized by the UN. If her assumption is that Taiwan is 
not a viable as a nation, with a national identity, then she should state 
her belief at the outset. Furthermore, she becomes a little overcritical on 
certain details, such as the boy scout-like organizations created for the 
purpose of serving the state – that was their original purpose, 
neoliberalism or not. I don’t see how she intended to emphasize state 
subservience through state-formed organizations in the new neoliberal 
Taiwan when the previous version of the China Youths National 
Salvation Corps was intended to prepare boys for mandatory military 
service. So the goal now is happiness – both means serve the state 
ends, anyway.
Hoffman appears to be the most thorough and clearly articulated of the 
three authors, though her scope is the narrowest. She gives a more 
thorough look at a few of the issues Hanser, who looks at the broad 
changes, summarizes. Hanser, though lacking some connections 
between basic facts and speculations, such as the link between 
neoliberalism and the Chinese urge towards fulfillment through work, 
presents an interesting view of the neoliberalization of the job market, 
from both an employer and an employee’s view. Hoffman then points out 
that, previous to the reform era, there was no job market to speak of.
With all this negative talk about neoliberalization, one has to wonder if 
it’s bad. Yes, it presents everything as a commodity, and yes, there are 
cultural downsides. But I think that every negative aspect of 
neoliberalism is just an example of a trend within the framework that can 
be reversed without necessarily negating neoliberalism itself. Public 
institutions are adversely affected – if neoliberal subjects were to vote 
with their money, wouldn’t it necessarily reverse the situation? And if not, 
then what is the true role of government and how could it best serve the 
people?
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And Ge Jin's Gold Farmer Presentation...
Digital Korea
-Koreans are scarily connected, but this future is what I wrote my award-
losing scholarship essay on.
-This essay neglects Facebook. Wonder what kind of connection 
Facebook and Cyworld have?
-Generation C? I thought we were millennials. Unless the author is 
talking about Korean youths in particular. Whatever. We're definitely the 
pioneering generation of social networking.
-These txtrs r crzy. txt gr4mm3r in ess4ys? W4nn4 l1v3 in |\|u Zeal4nd 
n0w.
-Whoa, phone replacement rates are crazy. I've had mine for years. I 
guess it's really true that this generation can navigate new UI's like crazy 
mongooses, though.
-Citi in m4 p0ck3t, cool
-Whoa...networking...rise of social networking is positively correlated 
with physical fiber networks...?
-I wonder if SMS really is an excuse to be rude...who determines these 
things anyway? What's rude? Long, winding, circumlocutions are rude 
sometimes. More subtleties, perhaps, but more laborious. It's a youth 
culture...I guess we're just not polite with each other. Actually, a majority 
of anonymous internet users are also not polite, as per John Gabriel's 
Greater Internet F***wad Theory (http://penny-
arcade.com/comic/2004/3/19/). Rudeness just seems to be funny, most 
of the time. Guess that's just another generational divide.
-Cool article. I knew there was a telecom advantage, but to know the 
specifics is humbling.
Negotiating Intra-Asian Games Networks
-Yeah, yeah, MMO's are big in Korea
-Yes, they also rock the house in SC, and probably will in SCII as well 
(Star Craft)
-Ultima Online was the prototypical MMO, and that and SC are pretty 
American (don't believe Lord British)
-CJK East Asian MMO? Lemme at it!
-Goldfarming and Chinese goldfarmers ("Chinese farming" sounds pretty 
stupid) - this just means that MMOs need to reduce grinding...so does 
RL, for that matter
-Well, that was boring. Let's read the article on Freestyle DDR instead.
-Wow, I didn't know the breakdance revival came from Asia...specifically 
from DDR!
-Hahaha, high correlation to Asian American populations...
-http://10kcommotion.com
-http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-416431628064546280
Ge Jin's Chinese Gold Farmers Presentation
-Daaaang, that looks like my cousin's basement.
-...wait...Brandon?
-Not even kidding. The screens and the crowded set-up looks like my 
cousin's basement. Also, my cousins pwrlvl'd in DAoC (Dark Age of 
Camelot) and sold accounts for money.
-PS, did you know there's an economist working on analyzing EVE 
online?
-Poor hygiene and working conditions is just another word for MMO 
addiction in general.
-I wish I could be paid to play videogames. Video game alpha-testers, 
anyone?
-This is the low end of the pro-gamer ladder...the high paid gamers are 
in Counter-Strike, StarCraft, and others that I don't care about enough to 
know about. Here are some Pro-gamer winnings from tournaments: 
http://clanbase.ggl.com/news.php?nid=204859. They include Meng 
"Rocketboy" Yang, a Chinese guy who beat American gaming legend 
Johnathan “Fatal1ty” Wendel. And incidentally made over $100,000 in 
doing so.
-Cool. Gaming culture.
Preliminary 
Question: 
International students from Asia are known to choose engineering as a 
major to such a degree that at one point the University of Toronto's 
Engineering department was known as the "Hong Kong Express" (Ong), 
and is, even today, dominated by mainland Chinese students. But why? 
What qualities make a North American engineering education worth the 
expense, and to what extent is it a neoliberal "skill enhancing 
activity" (Brooks) or vocational pursuit (Ong)?
Are these future international engineers motivated by money, passion, 
or something else entirely? To what extent are they neoliberal subjects?
To facilitate answering these questions, I propose in-depth interviews of 
a small sample of such international engineers at the University of Illinois 
at Urbana-Champaign regarding their chosen subject field, their interest 
in their work and field of science, and their ambitions and plans for the 
future, as well as hypothetical questions regarding the possibilities that 
an engineering degree from a prestigious American university grants 
them.
Interview/Ob
serv. #1: 
Codename: Alita
My first interview was with an undergraduate female non-heritage 
advanced Chinese language learner (CHIN 306). Arriving somewhat late 
to the interview, as has been observed to be a tendency of this author 
regarding deadlines, I was afraid my tardiness would color the interview, 
but thankfully it did not. As I approached the subject, I noticed she was 
sitting next to an Asian male who looked like an undergraduate as well. 
They were sitting close together and seemed to be chatting with each 
other in English in a relaxed manner. This man would later be revealed 
as the subject's Chinese boyfriend.
After meeting, the man took a respectful distance as we began our 
interview. As we had met before, the subject and I were relatively 
comfortable speaking, though at first she seemed somewhat distracted 
by the cell phone I used as a recording device, a Ming A1200 that had 
never been released in the US. I hoped she would not aim her face at it 
the entire interview, as I trusted the microphone was of sufficient quality 
to record our voices in an authentic conversation. I am glad to note that 
as the interview went on, the device became unobtrusive and she faced 
me rather than the phone.
This subject initially placed out of a language requirement for graduation 
from the UIUC by taking the Spanish proficiency test. However, she 
made many Mandarin-speaking Chinese friends in her freshman year, 
noting that her best friend spoke Mandarin and that she would be teased 
from time to time for not being able to speak Mandarin. Deciding she'd 
learn the language to prove them wrong, she registered for a Chinese 
class "for fun." As the classes were entirely booked, she wrote a letter 
with false sentiments regarding her intention to use Chinese 
professionally in the future, and managed to obtain a seat in the 
beginning Chinese class. Ironically, these false sentiments would 
become reality as her enjoyment and appreciation of the Chinese 
language grew.
In fact, her involvement with the language and culture led to her 
switching majors after a trip abroad to China, from a physical science to 
East Asian Languages and Culture. She will be spending time abroad in 
China again, attempting to gain fluency in the language and network 
while attending the same university her boyfriend, a visiting scholar, 
once attended. Interestingly, she said that she would not have 
considered living in China before she began going out with her 
boyfriend, even if she had a professional career interest in China.
As for her professional interests in China, she intends to "go back" and 
teach English, perhaps get an internship, and then perhaps attend 
graduate school. She also hinted at the possibility of starting a business 
in China. She seems to have high faith in job-security with EALC, hinting 
that the situation for China was improving. Her faith in her ability to adapt 
socially, however, was not as strong, citing her "not-so great" Chinese, 
and her American-ness. She also said that she might miss American 
culture.
In regards to the language classes here at the UIUC, she viewed the 
beginning classes as "fun" and "silly," while she found the advanced 
classes to be of more interest as her ability to formulate advanced ideas 
and speak fluently grew. She noted that beginning Chinese required 
learning traditional Chinese characters, whereas her teacher during her 
study-abroad trip China told her to "relearn everything in simplified." She 
had a slightly confused reaction to the explanation that traditional 
characters should be learned for cultural value and for some usage, 
taking that explanation, it seemed, with a grain of salt.
She also expressed a preference for her Chinese teacher rather than for 
her teachers in America. And grammar lessons.
This subject was interesting for a variety of reasons, the highlight of 
which was that her involvement with Chinese did not originate in a 
career-oriented mindset, but was socially driven. Furthermore, her 
career goals emerged out of her involvement with Chinese, and her 
entire life plan changed after her study abroad trip. However, if I could 
turn back time, impossible as it may seem, I would not arrive late, first of 
all, and target my questions better towards her views on Chinese itself 
rather than how she would use it or how she came to it. I would also ask 
more about her boyfriend and how they met, seeing as he is Chinese. I 
would also ask about popular media in her life in an attempt to connect 
with our readings on Iwabuchi.
Group 
Research 
Question: 
Version #3
In David Brook's "The Organization Kid," Ann Anagnost's "Child as 
Value," and the A*Star Yearbook, evidence has pointed towards a 
heightened sense of global competition in neoliberalizing nations, which 
in turn focuses attention on particular skills development for children and 
students. Language is appreciated as one skill that is an asset for 
international business; Japanese has been a longstanding favorite 
however, due largely in part to China's meteoric economic ascent, 
Chinese has emerged as a contending option for students. We are 
interested in whether - and to what extent - non-heritage Chinese and 
Japanese Language learners at the University of Illinois see their 
language acquisition as an advantage in the global labor marketplace. 
Further, we are interested in exploring the extent of involvement with 
East Asia that they expect to have in their future lives and careers. We 
are also interested in what factors outside the potential market value of a 
given language motivated them to begin their studies (i.e. familial 
influence, personal interest etc.) as well as whether or not their personal 
lives are culturally affected through the language learning process.
We want to find out if advanced Japanese and Chinese language 
learners see themselves in a global playing field or in only a US playing 
field, referring back to Brooks, Boo, and Ong. Are they using their 
language as "flexible capital" as Ong called it? Will this language just be 
capital for them in the US? Are they aware of the "changing 
world" (pacific age?)? Are they also aware or unaware of the changing 
power distribution?
EUI Links: 
Interview/Ob
serv. #2: 
Codename: Akira
My second subject was an International Studies major with a minor in 
business, and a male non-heritage advanced Chinese language learner. 
I met him at the Illini Union, where I was, unfortunately, already 
extremely tired from the day's events, which may have contributed to the 
lack of depth in my interview.
My subject seemed very well aware of China's growing politico-
economic role. When asked about why he chose to learn Chinese, he 
made references to the economic power of China and its "challenge" to 
the United States.
As a senior in High School, this subject studied both Japanese and 
Chinese, the primary languages under consideration in this project, and 
chose Chinese, believing it would be more useful and easier than 
learning Japanese. Many of the subjects friends on the UIUC campus 
speak Chinese, as well as a few who speak Japanese. His ideal post-
graduation career is to work abroad in China for about 2 years. While he 
could "possibly" see himself living in China, he also did not see himself 
staying in any one place for long periods of time, though he did concede 
that he would ideally have someplace to call home. Similarly, he did not 
want to work for a company for a long period of time, hoping to one day 
start his own small business or franchise.
He said he would probably learn another region's language if that area 
were to gain prominence.
This subject was fascinating because he seemed to fit the expected 
mold so well - he casually considers crossing national borders, as a truly 
cosmopolitan neoliberal subject would, intending to use language skills 
as flexible capital, and has an entrepreneurial spirit. However, a few 
hesitations gave away perhaps more depth than is at first apparent. For 
instance, when I reflect on the interview, he never said, specifically, that 
the reason he decided to take Chinese was because of economic 
reasons. Instead, he merely stated the reasons why taking Chinese was 
a good economic decision. Furthermore, in later questions, though 
perhaps just a slip, he said that taking Chinese was a "random choice." 
He immediately followed it up by rescinding the statement, but combined 
with the above observation may have meant that factors other than 
economic ones were more instrumental than seemed at first glance. It 
would be interesting to delve into the social dynamics of non-heritage 
language learners, as both of my subjects hinted at social influences on 
their choice of language.
Codename: Kazuma
My third interview was a Chinese language TA, whom I interviewed on a 
terse improvisational basis due to time constraints and lack of notice 
ahead of time. Thankfully, he was patient and kind enough to answer my 
questions.
Interestingly, he noted that there was a variety of majors represented in 
his class, which, though small, could be argued to be significant because 
of its small size. He specifically mentioned East Asian Languages and 
Culture, engineering, and business majors. When asked about his 
students' intentions to go abroad, he said that about half of his students 
were planning to go to a Chinese-speaking nation in the near future for 
research and studies or business. Many of his students indicated a 
greater involvement with China, either by pursuing a Master's degree or 
a business opportunity, which would entail living in China.
Frustratingly, when asked, twice, whether there were a great deal of 
advanced Chinese language students, he explained first that his class 
size was just right, and the second time explained the difference 
between heritage and non-heritage Chinese language learners, as well 
as the institutional methods for testing proficiency.
Group 
Summary: 
Although we completed 12 interviews due to the changing nature of our 
project a few of our initial interviews have limited use with regard to our 
final inquiry. We sought to discover the motivations behind non-heritage 
undergraduates studying the Chinese and Japanese languages at 
advanced levels. We hypothesized that Chinese is currently displacing 
Japanese as the East Asian business language of choice for students 
involved in a career path affected by transnational neoliberalism, while 
Japanese students are increasingly learning Japanese for personal 
reasons or out of a desire to work in the entertainment industry.
In accordance with our hypothesis we found that those students studying 
Chinese tended to be very goal-oriented and had a very clear idea of 
using Chinese as an advantage and commodity in their future careers, 
much like David Brooke's "skill enhancement" in the "Organization Kid." 
Those studying Japanese who expressed an interest in entering the 
entertainment industry developed their career goals over the course of 
their studies rather than entering the language learning process with 
them in mind. Additionally, not all of the Japanese students planned on 
using the language professionally. Those studying Chinese were very 
conscious of the "flexible capital" (Ong) they gained by learning Chinese, 
while, overall, Japanese students had a tendency to be less interested in 
business-oriented careers requiring Japanese fluency.
Interestingly both Chinese and Japanese students seeking to use their 
language skills professionally intend to work either in America or for an 
American company in Asia on a temporary basis as opposed to making 
a long-term commitment to working in East Asia. However, while they 
predominantly plan to work in America, they see themselves as global 
players on an internationally competitive level. In the case of the 
Chinese students, this may reflect an awareness of the possibility that 
China will supercede America economically while giving a nod to the 
present reality of America as the current world superpower, or simply a 
faith in the continued success of America. 
Perhaps related to their differing motives for studying their respective 
languages, the Chinese students had a tendency overall to be less 
invested in Chinese culture whereas the Japanese students showed 
greater dedication to Japanese culture. We saw this through both their 
reactions to studying abroad and lifestyle here at the university. For 
instance, one Chinese student who proclaimed that he "lived by" the 
Chinese culture could not name a single example of Chinese culture, 
save for a trend among women for having pale skin. This, unfortunately, 
is not even specific to China, but can be seen in various East Asian 
cultures today. In contrast, two of the Japanese students interviewed 
talked enthusiastically about the myriad of ways Japanese popular 
culture has infiltrated their everyday lives, including an enjoyment of both 
traditional food and candy, reading manga, and deliberately seeking 
further enrichment in cultural activities.
Paper: As Japan's rapid modernization in the first half of the 20th century 
shocked the world into acknowledging the value of learning Japanese, so too is 
China's recent economic growth throwing Mandarin Chinese, or putonghua, the 
common language, into the limelight. As a Time Magazine issue put it, the 21st 
century is China's century. But what became of Japan's century, and the value 
placed on Japanese as a language? And is the learning of Chinese among 
advanced undergraduate language learners displacing Japanese as the East Asian 
business language of choice? What motivations drive advanced students of either 
language? Where do they see themselves in the future? My colleagues, Kasey 
Alms, Patrick Carmody, Rachel Lenz, and myself set out to find what answers we 
could within the bounds of the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign.
Our analyses of the data we collected were informed by weekly readings 
including broad overviews of neoliberalism by Lisa Duggan and Henry Giroux. 
Of particular interest were the observations that while neoliberalism might result 
in the highest economic efficiency, certain sacrifices, such as the polarization of 
the upper and lower economic classes as well as human rights issues and even 
Democracy itself, must be made in order to better satisfy the 
production/consumption machine that is the economy. This was borne out in 
David Brook's “Organization Kid,” in which he notes that today's child is shuttled 
between activity to activity in order to better prepare them for a competitive 
future. He calls this child the Organization Kid, living a regimented life with no 
free time to explore or play, or to be a kid. Instead, every waking moment is an 
investment into their value, as they are signed up for one skill-enhancing activity 
after another.
Meanwhile, in a little Indian village called Chennai, an industry springs 
up around cheap, high quality labor produced by the natives, instilled with an 
American culture of competitiveness that, in many aspects, edges out the native 
culture. These laborers are able to co-opt the American-style corporate culture 
and excel at learning various technical and communication skills that lead to 
greater profitability, though sometimes at the cost of putting them at odds with 
their parents and their culture at large. Cross-referencing Ong's Higher Learning 
in Global Space, this is a display of subjects' abilities to learn and commoditize 
the learning of skills in Information Technology, communication, English, and 
even culture itself. There is an increasing presence of international students in 
America – the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, in the heart of 
America, has the highest international enrollment of any university in the nation, 
emphasizing Ong’s hypothesis for the ruptured nation-state as the framework for 
global education strategies.
With an increasingly connected world, transnational flows of culture 
become more obvious in the wake of the “Korean Wave” and the 
“Pokemonization” of the world. In Anagnost’s “Child as Value,” we saw the 
ambivalence of American teachers to the lives of Chinese children; on one hand 
decrying the “overregimented” lives of the kids while at the same time harboring 
a growing insecurity about the education of American children. All of these 
factors contribute to increased contact zones in the US and abroad for neoliberal 
logics to spread, such as the dedication of time during the valuable childhood and 
studenthood periods of development towards “skill enhancing activities,” where 
skills are themselves seen as flexible capital. Thus, the process of laboring for 
valuable goods begins at an early age.
That said, our hypothesis was that Chinese is currently displacing 
Japanese as the East Asian business language of choice for students involved in a 
career path affected by transnational neoliberalism, while Japanese students are 
increasingly learning Japanese for personal reasons or out of a desire to work in 
the entertainment industry. On the whole, our subjects' responses and our 
hypothesis resonated with a surprising strength.
We purposefully limited our ethnographic surveys to advanced non-
heritage Chinese and Japanese students in order to reduce white noise from 
heritage learners who sought simply to reclaim their heritage, and to select those 
students who had shown great dedication to the language. Unfortunately, the 
scope of our project was also limited by the resources available, meaning it was 
constrained to a single semester with four student researchers and a limited 
geography. Equally crippling as the rest combined was the lack of any 
operational budget. Therefore, while certain data points in this project are 
intriguing, the conclusions and analyses we reach can only be considered a 
preliminary survey, as the data are too limited to draw broad conclusions from.
Overall, the four Chinese students we interviewed were overwhelmingly 
skewed towards the business sector, as each displayed an interest in the use of 
advanced Chinese language skills to start a business or otherwise professionally 
employ their adopted language. Three of our subjects were remarkably cognizant 
of and even spoke specificially of the economic rise of China, implying the 
proportional rise in the value of Chinese as they did. The fourth, meanwhile, did 
not cite economic reasons as her primary interest in the language, though, in an 
interesting twist of fate, she used the very same reasoning to bargain her way into 
the introductory Chinese class, which was closed to enrollment at the time, and 
realized the benefits after her involvement in the language grew. She, too, later 
mentioned that she might be interested in starting a business in China. It is 
interesting to note that the subjects most invested in the economics of learning 
Chinese were male.
In an almost shocking fit with our hypothesis was the case of "Akira," one 
of the male subjects, who responded that he would "probably" be willing to learn 
a different nation's language were that nation to gain prominence, and had studied 
both Japanese and Chinese in High School, eventually choosing Chinese. This 
illustrates the subject's investment in the "flexible capital" of the language itself. 
The male subjects displayed a cultural distance from the culture of China, 
evinced by a lack of willingness to live there permanently, or to be employed by 
Chinese companies as opposed to American companies, or showed a lack of faith 
in the ability of China to deal with ambiguous "problems they just sweep under a 
rug" that apparently threaten the trustworthiness of China. Even the female 
subject, who was dating a Chinese Ph.D student at the time, showed a wariness 
towards living in China, with her, "not-so-great" Chinese and her American-ness, 
though her reasons seemed more social than the male subjects' reasons. Overall, it 
seemed like American hegemony still had some grasp on the imaginations of the 
students, with the Chinese language being a relatively secure path to prosperity.
Meanwhile, the Japanese students were a mixed bag in terms of motivation. 
While the Chinese students, for the most part, knew the economics of learning 
Chinese, the Japanese students mostly entered the learning process with popular 
media, such as manga or anime, in mind. Later, they would come to realize the 
career advantages it conferred upon them and seek to join the very industry that 
spawned their interest, which serves to strengthen my conviction in our 
hypothesis. Yet, another student began the learning process to fulfill an inner 
passion that had little bearing on the rest of the world. Culturally, the Japanese 
students tended to have much more vested interest in products of Japanese 
culture, such as manga or anime; according to Ms. Lenz, the colleague who 
interviewed the Japanese students, they "live, eat, and breathe the culture." 
Indeed, the prominence of anime and manga in the interviews with the Japanese 
students speaks very strongly of this statement.
However, while their introductions to the language through popular 
culture and their continued investment in the culture remain constant, there were 
certain aspects of the Japanese students' dialogues that fell out of line with our 
hypothesis. For example, the student who pursued Japanese from an inner passion 
also seemed willing to bet that Japanese would remain an economically 
significant language. Despite having considered learning Chinese, he chose 
Japanese instead partly because of the "opportunities" and belief in its continued 
prominence. He also displays a certain economic logic in choosing to enroll in 
business Japanese in his next semester, as well as indicating that he would not 
work for a Japanese company unless the financial benefits were high enough. He 
also indicated an interest in starting a business. A second interview by Mr. 
Carmody revealed another business-oriented individual who was introduced to 
the language by a fluent elder sibling in the form of anime and manga, and 
believed in the future economic stability of Japan, citing popular culture and 
globalizing companies.
Similarly to the Chinese students, none of the Japanese students fully 
cleaved, spatially, economically, or culturally, to the homeland of their adopted 
language, preferring an American job to a job abroad, though some were willing 
to concede that it might be an option. The Chinese students, while displaying a 
more cohesive agreement with the hypothesis, also showed signs of deviance. For 
example, the motivations of "Alita," the student with the Chinese boyfriend, were 
purely socially motivated at the outset, as many of her friends spoke Mandarin 
Chinese, and she was at one point the butt of many jokes for not being able to 
understand. Her decision to speak Chinese was simply to prove them wrong - that 
she could speak Chinese. It was ironic, therefore, that her rehearsed reasons for 
bargaining her way into the class eventually became true. Akira, too, had a large 
number of Chinese-speaking friends that may have influenced his decision. I am 
led to believe that this may have been the case through a subtlety of his speech 
that I did not catch at first - when I asked him why he sought to learn Chinese, he 
immediately jumped to the economic benefits without drawing a direct causation 
as to why he had chosen Chinese. While it may have simply been a habit of 
speaking, it may also have been a convenient explanation for learning a language 
that many of his friends spoke as well. However, I will not delve too much into 
double-guessing the subject; instead, I can only note the incident and hope to be 
more specific in the future.
In conclusion, while there were broad overarching vectors that matched 
our hypothesis, regarding the Chinese students' motivations and the impetus for 
learning Japanese, certain details remain outside the scope of our hypothesis, but 
open to further exploration.
Reflect: The entirety of the project was nothing too epic or profound, merely an 
exploration into students' ideas about Chinese and Japanese, which, I think, was a 
perfect size for a project with these constraints. Anything on a grander scale 
would have failed to reach conclusions of any sort, given the various limitations 
on our resources, and even the conclusions that we did reach riddled holes in our 
initial hypothesis, despite their seeming overall fit.
To recapitulate the constraints on the project, purposeful and not, they 
were:
• Time limit (one semester) 
• Languages (Chinese and Japanese)
• Human resources (four student researchers, three of which are 
undergraduates) 
• Interviewed only advanced non-heritage Chinese and Japanese 
language students 
• Small sample size
• Subjects came from only a few class sections 
• $0.00 operational budget, AKA no budget whatsoever
So, to draw broad conclusions from the data we received would be, in this 
researcher's opinion, too foolhardy, especially concerning the variables we did 
not or were not able to control and therefore unable to investigate within the 
limitations stated above. These include, but are not limited to:
• Socially driven motivation for learning 
• Major/minor requirements (EALC) 
• Instrumentalization of language for purposes other than economic 
reasons 
• Degree of personal interest or history of involvement with the 
language 
Personally, a few difficulties came from being unable to meet deadlines 
and meet with my subjects on time. This resulted in an aborted meeting with a 
Korean TA who happened to be a TA for one of my classes, which could have 
been disastrous for my GPA. Thankfully, she is not a vindictive person. Another 
time, I arrived late for a meeting, though thankfully the interview did not seem to 
have been affected by my tardiness. However, it is key to realize that it could 
easily have offended the subject.
The methodology of my data collection was casual exploratory 
conversation, recorded on a cellphone. This seemed to be sufficiently effective, 
though it should be noted that the cellphone used was very sophisticated. There 
were a few gaffes in getting the IRB slips signed - I wasn't aware at first that 
there was one copy for myself and one for the interview subject. I also received 
probably an inordinate amount of amusement by changing my subjects' names to 
post-apocalyptic anime characters' names, for their security, of course. 
Meanwhile, working in a fully online environment worked to my advantage, as it 
is quite natural for me to sit at a computer for hours at a time and do nothing. At 
least this way, I was productive. Finally, I fully submit every part of this work to 
archive, which is convenient in that I no longer have to archive everything myself 
- I can simply refer back to the IDEALS project online. I suppose I'll put this on 
my resume as a publication, but having just now referred to a resume which will 
refer to this document, I fear I will have created a literary infinitely recursive self-
referential wormhole. If this is the cause for problems in the future, I deny 
culpability for the irrevocable loss of any and all literary works or thoughts to this 
phenomenon.
Recommend
ations: 
Due to the results of our project, I would recommend that Japanese as a 
business language remain a strong presence on campus and in the curricula, as 
many students still maintain belief in the utility of Japanese on the international 
marketplace, despite China's economic rise. Furthermore, I would suggest that 
Chinese curricula reinforce the culture of China as well as teaching technical 
aptitude at the language - the two should be inseparable. If they are separated, I 
believe the result would possibly be jarring on an individual scale as the Chinese 
students seeking to utilize the language seek to interact with Chinese citizens. 
Furthermore, the ambiguity of China's problems that were found in multiple 
interviews should be addressed, though I do not know when or where an 
instructor would address these issues in a language class. What seems important 
is to stress the Chinese view of things as well as the American view, hoping to 
reduce the tensions between the two cultures. One might say that while these 
students, more often than not, saw the economic stresses between the two nations 
as a battle, the truth is that both nations must learn to coexist with each other in 
the long run. Therefore the trope of "battle" or "rivalry" should be mitigated.
